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I. Bulls and Bears
One of the timeliest and most prescient books 
I’ve come across in the last fifteen years is Edward 
Chancellor’s popular history of financial speculation 
Devil take the Hindmost. Chancellor had worked as 
an investment banker for Lazard Brothers in Lon-
don and had contributed to the Financial Times and 
The Economist and so was well acquainted with what 
he called “This Bubble World” (3), echoing the poet 
Francis Quarles’s seventeenth-century work Emblems. 
“What’s lighter than the mind,” Quarles asked, “A 
thought. Than thought? This bubble world” (qtd. in 
Chancellor 3). Chancellor’s pleasant book itself is 
“light” reading, certainly not a work of philosophy, 
as I had been used to, with its dizzying arguments, 
something less than that as a thought is less than the 
mind. And yet not quite a scholarly history, where 
ideas take on the dramatic role of players, something 
less than that. What is less than that? The thing called 
speculation and our derivative world of modernity. 
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For all intents and purposes, Chancellor’s book 
starts with the seventeenth century and Joseph de la 
Vega’s Confusion de Confusiones, the first description 
of stock market activity in Western Europe in 1688 
(11-14). After brief remarks about the scant clas-
sical and medieval precursors, Chancellor presents 
stock market speculation as bursting onto the scene 
fully formed, like some early modern Athena from 
the head of Zeus. And it’s telling that Chancellor is 
most concerned with the speculative psychology as 
presented in de la Vega’s work, which approximates 
what we nowadays call manic-depression (13). The 
compulsiveness, the  superstitions, and even the bulls 
and bears were there from the beginning, he says, 
“the liefhebbers (‘lifter’s up’ . . . ) who were ‘scared of 
nothing’” and “the contremines (‘underminers’ . . .), 
who were ‘completely ruled by fear, trepidation, and 
nervousness’” (Chancellor 12). Certainly some (if not 
most) of the participants vacillated between the two, 
“exhibit[ing] signs of split personality” (Chancellor 
12). Indeed, de la Vega himself had observed that 
“there are many occasions in which every speculator 
seems to have two bodies, so that astonished observ-
ers see a human fighting himself” (qtd. in Chancellor 
12).
To Chancellor, this recalled nothing so much as the 
behavior observed by Charles Cotton in his Compleat 
Gamester, first published in 1674 and again in 1680 
(11). As the epigraph to Chancellor’s preface makes 
clear, speculation is nothing but gambling. Sir Ernest 
Cassell, banker to Edward VII, recalled that “when I 
was young, people called me gambler. As the scale of 
my operations increased, I became known as a specu-
lator.” “Now I am called a banker,” he says, “but I have 
been doing the same thing all along” (qtd. in Chancel-
lor ix).
As a fellow at UNLV’s Center for Gaming Research, 
I had privileged access to Special Collections which 
included a second edition of Cotton’s manual. David 
Schwartz, in his wonderful history of gambling, tells 
us that the field of “how-to” books had been opened 
initially by Cardano but in the seventeenth century 
the market had exploded with French gambling man-
uals appearing as early as 1647, English translations 
in 1651, and then English manuals proper (167). I am 
particularly taken with certain passages from the first 
chapter of Cotton’s volume, “Of Gaming in General,” 
in which he describes the “miserable Gamester” (3). 
“This restless man,” he says, “is the proper subject of 
every man’s pity. Restless I call him, because (such is 
the itch of play) either winning or losing he can never 
rest satisfied, if he wins he thinks to win more, if he 
loses he hopes to recover” (Cotton 3). “Thus,” Cotton 
writes, “have I heard of some who with Five pounds 
have won Four Hundred pounds in one night, and 
the next Night have lost it to a sum not half so much; 
others who have lost their estates and won them 
again with addition, yet could not be quiet till they 
lost them irrecoverably” (3). Indeed, “gaming hath 
this ill property above all other Vices, that it renders 
a man incapable of prosecuting any serious action, 
and makes him always unsatisfied with his own con-
dition,” for “he is either lifted up to of mad joy with 
success, or plunged to the bottom of despair by mis-
fortune, always in extremes, always in a storm” (1).
This talk of restlessness, confined here to the 
gamester, recalls certain moments from the history 
of philosophy. Consider Spinoza, for instance, the 
philosopher of Amsterdam, and his Theological-Po-
litical Treatise published anonymously in 1670 and 
then posthumously in 1677, contemporaneous with 
Cotton’s Gamester and roughly ten years before de la 
Vega’s Confusiones. The Treatise begins by claiming 
that “men would never be superstitious, if they could 
govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they 
were always favoured by fortune,” seeming impossi-
bilities (Spinoza 3). “But,” he continues, as it is, 
being frequently driven into straits where rules are 
useless, and being often kept fluctuating pitiably 
between hope and fear by the uncertainty of for-
tune’s greedily coveted favours, they are conse-
quently, for the most part, very prone to credulity 
. . . especially when hope and fear are struggling 
for mastery. (Spinoza 3)
Spinoza jokes that everyone recognizes this as 
fact about his neighbor—not himself, of course—for 
everybody knows that “most people, when in pros-
perity, are so over-brimming with wisdom (however 
inexperienced they may be), that they take every offer 
of advice as a personal insult, whereas in adversity 
they know not where to turn, but beg and pray for 
counsel from every passer-by” (3).
Notice the similarities between Cotton’s game-
ster, Spinoza’s average joe, and de la Vega’s stock 
operator: the extremes of joy and despondency, 
the winner’s restless “hope” (or greed) that his 
winnings will increase indefinitely and the flail-
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ing loser who will not satisfied until he lose it all 
irrecoverably, the illusion of complete self-suffi-
ciency followed by the illusion of wretchedness, 
the ultimate bad beat, casting about for saviors on 
every corner. “Always in extremes,” Cotton writes, 
“always in a storm.” “The proper subject of every 
man’s pity” is himself, along with the rest of us, for 
we are all speculators on the verge of wreck. We are 
all in the exact same boat.
II. Looking on the Wreck
I want to talk about ships and storms for a mo-
ment. After Cotton’s discussion of the restlessness of 
gamesters, he concludes the following: “And therefore 
fitly was that question propounded, Whether men in 
Ships at Sea were to be accounted among the living or the 
dead, because there were but few inches between them 
and drowning” (3). “The same [inquiry] may be made 
of great Gamesters,” he casually adds, “though their 
estates be never so considerable, Whether they are to 
esteemed poor or rich, since there are but few Casts 
at Dice betwixt a rich man (in that circumstance) and 
a beggar” (Cotton 3). 
Cotton’s original audience may have been remind-
ed of that great shipwreck, The Tempest, originally 
performed in 1611, first printed as the opening play 
of Shakespeare’s collected works in 1623, and then 
radically revamped by Davenant and Dryden in 1667 
(published three years later). The play begins at sea 
in the middle of a storm. A ship is carrying Alonso, 
the king of Naples, his brother, and other nobles. The 
opening lines, however, are not spoken by a noble 
but by the master of the boat, who basically hands 
over control of the situation, what little there is, to 
his subordinate the boatswain. In the middle of the 
action, which is intense, the ship in serious danger of 
capsizing, the boatswain is interrupted (is repeatedly 
interrupted) by the noblemen, the king himself first 
of all. 
The king asks where the master is, and the boat-
swain responds: “Do you not hear him? You mar our 
labour. Keep your cabins! You do assist the storm” 
(Shakespeare 144). Gonzalo, a wise old counselor, 
tries to quiet the boatswain down—“nay, good be 
patient” (Shakespeare 144)—but the sailor will have 
none of it: “When the sea is! Hence. What cares these 
roarers for the name of the king? To cabin! Silence! 
Trouble us not” (Shakespeare 145). Gonzalo, still 
trying to smooth things over, cautions the man to re-
member his noble cargo: “Good, yet remember whom 
thou hast on board” (Shakespeare 145). Still franti-
cally working, trying to keep the ship from splitting 
apart, the boatswain had enough: “None that I more 
love than myself” (Shakespeare 145). “You are a 
councilor,” he says to Gonzalo, “if you can command 
these elements to silence and work the peace of the 
present, we will not hand a rope more. Use your 
authority!” (Shakespeare 145). If you can command 
the sea and storm, he’s saying, then do it, if not “give 
thanks that you have lived so long and make yourself 
ready in your cabin for the mischance of the hour, if 
it so hap” (Shakespeare 145). If you can help, do it; if 
you can’t, get out of the way—go below and get ready 
to die. 
The noblemen are shocked by the boatswain’s be-
havior and heap abuse on him: “A pox o’ your throat, 
you bawling, blasphemous, incharitable dog,” says 
Sebastian; Antonio shouts: “Hang, cur! Hang, you 
whoreson, insolent noise-maker! We are less afraid to 
be drowned than thou art” (Shakespeare 147). Ev-
eryone fears the worst, but Gonzalo, the wise, finds 
some comfort in the boatswain’s comportment: “I 
have a great comfort from this fellow. Methinks he 
hath no drowning mark upon him—his complexion 
is perfect gallows” (Shakespeare 145-146). Gonzalo 
thinks that the boatswain has a look of destiny about 
him and that the fate of someone so insolent as this 
cannot be an anonymous watery grave but rather 
must be the hangman’s noose. His destiny is not an-
onymity, but infamy, which is lucky for everyone else 
on the ship. “I’ll warrant him for drowning,” he says, 
“though the ship were no stronger than a nutshell 
and as leaky as an unstained wench” (Shakespeare 
147). For “warrant,” the Arden Shakespeare cites the 
Oxford English Dictionary: to guarantee or ensure (a 
person something)—in this case, Gonzalo offers to 
ensure the mariner against drowning. Certainly, gam-
blers are familiar with Gonzalo’s practice, offering 
a player insurance against the unlikely event of his 
pocket kings losing to queens and the like. The wise 
man, in essence, thinks drowning so unlikely for the 
boatswain that he’s willing to assume the man’s risk. 
Of course if he’s wrong, then no one will be around 
to collect. Except that he is wrong, and they survive 
nevertheless.
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One of the things that interest me about this scene 
is the way in which it brings together Cotton’s two 
questions: whether men in ships were to be accounted 
among the living and the dead and whether the great 
gamesters at their tables are to be esteemed poor or 
rich. In the opening scene of the The Tempest, the 
moral seems clear: in a crisis, the confusion of a storm, 
when only a few timbers separate the living man from 
the dead, the social distinctions of everyday life count 
for very little or nothing at all. The boatswain, a poor 
man, is worth more than that paradigmatic rich man, 
the king (he is, ironically, worth more to the king than 
the king himself). Even the wisdom of a Gonzalo is for 
naught if he lacks the power over nature to go with it, 
if he cannot command the elements. But for the aver-
age joe of Spinoza’s preface, who is so frequently driv-
en to such straits: doesn’t it seem that we are almost 
always in a crisis, always an inch away from disaster or, 
for that matter, glory?
In Cotton’s description of the gamester, the two 
questions are simply placed side by side; in Spino-
za’s preface, the questions are enveloped, as it were, 
by the philosophical question—the situation of the 
mariner and the gamester are instances of a more 
general situation, that which the vast majority of 
people always or almost inevitably find themselves 
in; in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, the questions of 
the mariner and of the gamester collapse into one 
scene, the wreck enacted before our eyes. So it comes 
as no surprise that de la Vega himself, before pass-
ing to a fuller description of bull and bear psycholo-
gies, speaks of the stock exchange environment as a 
“storm” threatening the operators’ leaky vessel and 
then, a couple of paragraphs later, as a “gambling 
hell” (161-162). Indeed, de la Vega the operator will 
turn almost Shakespearean, collapsing gamester and 
mariner, at least those of whom are pathological, in 
one image: “Oh, how many sick persons are there in 
the stock-gambling who resemble the fool, who throw 
themselves into this sea [of speculation] and who, 
when the waters reach their necks, return to firm 
ground” (188).
III. The Bosom of Abraham
In some way, these representations derive from or 
at least recall the two parables of Lazarus. The first 
one, mentioned in Luke, is the parable of the rich 
man, Dives, and the poor man, Lazarus. Completed in 
1611, the King James Bible gives:  
There was a certain rich man, which was clothed 
in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously 
every day. And there was a certain beggar named 
Lazarus, which was laid at his gate, full of sores, 
And desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell 
from the rich man’s table . . . . And it came to pass, 
that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels 
into Abraham’s bosom: the rich man also died, and 
was buried; And in hell he lift up his eyes . . . and 
seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom. 
And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mer-
cy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the 
tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue . . . . 
(Luke 16: 19-24)
Unmoved, Abraham concludes with a terrible 
moral: “Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime 
receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil 
things: but now he is comforted, and thou art tor-
mented” (Luke 16: 25). We are left wondering, like 
Cotton, whether the rich man, the great gamester in 
his royal purple, was to be esteemed wealthy in life 
or not, since Abraham can make Lazarus, who isn’t, 
at least seemingly, presented here as a remarkably 
virtuous man—he’s simply poor—since Abraham can 
make a king of Lazarus, a pauper of Dives. 
It’s an open question as to whether the Lazarus of 
Luke is the same Lazarus who is raised from the dead 
in John (most, I think, tend to separate the two). In 
this second story, the emphasis is not on riches ver-
sus poverty, but on health and life, on the one hand, 
and sickness and death, on the other; the emphasis 
is on a power that triumphs over sickness and death 
and that operates in this world, so that Lazarus is not 
raised on high, but instead restored to his earthly sis-
ter and family. There seems to be so little difference 
between death and life, in this world, that according 
to Martha, her brother Lazarus would not have died 
had Jesus been there—even so, he need only roll 
away the stone that blocks Lazarus’s tomb in order to 
restore him (John 11: 1-44).
What is clear, though, is that in the seventeenth 
century people wanted also, perhaps increasingly, to 
see the rich man Dives become the pauper Lazarus 
and vice versa in this world. Schwartz notes that 
“with the introduction of bank games and the prolif-
eration of professional gambling houses, a gambling 
mania swept over much of Europe . . . [and] that from 
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1650 to 1800 gambling occupied a place in Europe-
an society far more prominent than before or since” 
(93). It’s true—there had always been gambling, but 
now “it was common on a level never before seen” 
(Schwartz 93). With the opening of the Ridotto in 
1638, the first state-sanctioned public gambling 
house in European history, the state had found a 
way to capitalize on this fever. On the model of the 
late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century ridotti, 
where nobles no longer simply permitted gambling as 
before but actually profited from it by raking a por-
tion of the money staked, the state cemented an un-
precedented alliance with “mercantile gamblers, who 
ran games for profit, and government, who sought to 
legitimize the gamblers for purposes of public order 
and revenue enhancement” (Schwartz 95).
Europe had long had its carnivals, its saturnalia, 
with their Lords of Misrule and boy bishops. The 
world was temporarily turned upside down, the rich 
made poor and poor made rich, the noble made base 
and the ignoble gentile. All this was a temporary 
subversion of the social life, ultimately conservative 
of the status quo temporarily flaunted. But gambling 
at the Ridotto was like a carnival within the general 
carnival atmosphere, where these things weren’t just 
simulated, but where they happened for real. This 
was carnival gone wild, and it could be turned to the 
advantage of the state not only in its carnivalesque 
quality—that, for the most part, had been the case 
already—but this virtual storm, a mixture of “nobles, 
prostitutes, pimps, userers, police informants, . . . 
degenerate gamblers . . . [along with] curious visitors” 
(Schwartz 96)—this tempest could be turned to the 
State’s advantage in more ways than catharsis. 
So if Spinoza’s average joe was “driven to such 
straits”—by the way, my rudimentary sense of the 
Latin text of the Treatise is that the translation 
“straits” is a perfect English word to capture the 
Latin, which literally means “narrowness,” including 
any narrowness of the sea or land, and which figu-
ratively means, interestingly enough “poverty” (or 
a “pinch,” say). The language describing hope and 
fear is of these extremes “buffeting” the man, so the 
language even in Spinoza seems to hint of a possible 
shipwreck. One is driven into these dangerous straits, 
where he or she is likely to founder, wind-tossed by 
the extremes of hope and fear such that one is as 
likely to sink from the anxiety of it as from any rocks. 
In any event, if Spinoza’s average joe was driven into 
straits where “rules” cease to command and in which 
one is buffeted by the extremes of hope and fear—if 
he was “driven to such straits,” it’s clear that in ear-
ly modern Europe he was driving himself. And in 
droves. Extremes of hope and fear weren’t something 
to be purged, on the example of Aristotle’s theater, 
but rather something people were clearly seeking out. 
They didn’t want to be relieved from anxiety. They 
wanted to be anxious. Not only was this not threaten-
ing to the state, it was potentially enriching.
Another difference between the previous gambling 
and the kind now taking hold was the anonymity of 
the encounter in this sense: this new mercantile gam-
bling “let people play against an impersonal house 
for the price of the house edge” (Schwartz 92). It was 
no longer the case that if you and I gamble and you 
win, I must lose, so that the effect of that encounter 
spills out of the gambling house. My foe at the Ridot-
to was not a fellow player, but rather the house, so 
that seemingly there’s really no particular person to 
blame, no one to resent, if I lose (other than myself, 
if I choose), but also no one to praise, no one to be in-
debted to, if I win (other than myself, if I choose). All 
this is really rather ingenious: it combines the imper-
sonality of the firing squad with one bullet (no one 
knows who fired the fatal shot)—it’s better than the 
firing squad because no one in particular fires that 
fatal shot; it combines this with the impersonality of 
a Father Christmas—it’s better than a Santa Claus be-
cause the presents do not depend on my being naugh-
ty or nice since no one in particular is giving them. It 
is as impersonal and as amoral as a storm, and early 
modern people wanted to enact the wreck or, alter-
nately, to look on from a safe distance.
With this last remark, I’m echoing the great twen-
tieth century German philosopher Hans Blumenberg. 
In his first chapter from Shipwreck with Spectator, 
“Seafaring as a Transgression of Boundaries,” he asks:
What could have motivated the move from land to 
sea but a refusal of nature’s meager offerings, the 
monotony of agricultural labor, plus the addic-
tive vision of quickly won rewards, of more than 
reason finds necessary (the latter being something 
the philosophically inclined are always ready to 
find a formula for)—the vision, that is, of opu-
lence and luxury. (Blumenberg 9)
The idea, he adds, “that here, on the boundary be-
tween land and sea, what may not have been a fall but 
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was certainly a misstep into the inappropriateness 
and the immoderate was first taken, has the vividness 
that sustains lasting topoi” (Blumenberg 9).
IV. The Falling Sickness  
(or, the Storm Disease) 
Almost from the beginning, the disease we call ep-
ilepsy was known sometimes as “the sacred disease” 
but consistently as “the falling sickness,” for obvious 
reasons. Hippocrates, Galen and Aristotle—the great 
ancient medical authorities—knew it as both. The in-
fluence of these three philosophers, chiefly Galen and 
Aristotle, continued to hold sway in Western medi-
cine more or less until the mid to late sixteenth cen-
tury, at which time their supremacy was challenged 
by a new breed of doctor, the hermetic medicine of 
Paracelsus and his followers. Nowadays, a lot of us, 
unjustly, think of Paracelsus as some sort of alche-
mist quack—he was an alchemist, but no crank. At 
the time, this “modern,” new-wave of medicine-men 
vied in a most serious way, on some fronts successful-
ly, with the old guard.
And one of the most important, if not the chief 
battleground of that war was epilepsy (Temkin 172). 
The traditional medicine’s stunning lack of success 
in this area, its almost complete inability to offer 
effective treatments for this disease, much less 
cures—indeed, many within the tradition thought it 
incurable—this was a noticeable sore spot. Bernard 
of Gordon, for instance, summed up the resigned, 
traditional attitude nicely (and reasonably) when he 
admitted:
Nevertheless, I tell you, concerning epilepsy, that 
I have had in my treatment many people, young 
and old, rich and poor, men and women, suffering 
from almost every kind of epilepsy—Yet I have not 
one seen any one cured either by me or by another 
. . . [despite the fact that] I have been very careful 
in everything and the patients obedient. (qtd. in 
Temkin 165)
He concludes by cautioning physicians against 
making promises, for the falling sickness “is eradi-
cated [only] with great difficulty—if indeed it can be 
eradicated at all” (qtd. in Temkin 165). In the words 
of Owsei Temkin, which recall Cotton’s remarks on 
the gamester, “the epileptic was therefore considered 
[among all] a poor wretch, deserving pity” (165). But 
Paracelsus and the new breed were not so resigned 
and in fact accused the old guard of quackery. Doc-
tors, Paracelsus wrote, who thrive on slight diseases 
which (basically) cure themselves, but pretend that 
the “falling sickness” is incurable are frauds, for God 
had provided remedies for all diseases (Temkin 171). 
Clearly, if the early modern hermeticists could suc-
ceed in this area where the old-guard always failed, 
then the upstart medicine could be legitimated in 
spectacular fashion. 
It turns out that Paracelsus and his followers saw 
a very intimate link between storms and epilepsy. 
Indeed, thinking that man’s body was a microcosm 
mirror of the macrocosm as a whole, they reasoned 
that epilepsy was very literally a thunderstorm of the 
body, and that in order to understand it, we need-
ed to think about how thunderstorms originate in 
nature and treat the disease, in large part, through 
chemical means (Temkin 173-174). In its insistence 
on the analogy between microcosm and macrocosm, 
hermetic medicine would decline in importance for 
subsequent medical tradition, but in its focus on 
chemical remedies, unprecedented at the time, the 
new medicine would be most influential indeed. But 
it’s really the former—the analogy—that’s most in-
teresting to me. Here’s Paracelsus comparing a thun-
derstorm to epilepsy, the microcosmic fit: 
When a thunderstorm is on its way, the weather 
changes, the animals notice it and become restless. 
So man too becomes terrified when he feels an 
epileptic attach approaching [the so-called “aura,” 
which predicted attack]. Then clouds gather in the 
sky, while man’s eyesight becomes weakened and 
he feels sleepy. Next comes the wind, sweeping 
everything away; in the epileptic, the inner wind 
makes his abdomen and neck swell. Now the thun-
der breaks forth, shaking heaven and earth; now 
the epileptic is convulsed in all his limbs . . . . (qtd. 
in Temkin 174)
And finally, “a stroke of lightning break[s] walls 
and reduces everything to confusion—so the epilep-
tic’s limbs are bent and even broken by the invisible 
storm and lightning in his body” (qtd. in Temkin 
174), the body essentially imploding. 
To the audience of the The Tempest in 1611, or 
such audience members who had a familiarity with 
medicine—and there were perhaps not a few—the 
shipwreck in certain ways would have been an enact-
ing of an epileptic attack, in which the body, deprived 
of the guiding rational faculty or faculties (remember 
Center for Gaming Research | University of Nevada, Las Vegas   7
the king being exiled below deck by the boatswain), 
moved spasmodically and chaotically. The confused 
cries of the sailors and everyone involved—we split! 
we split!—enacted an epileptic body folding in on 
itself, but also with an incredible release of energy: 
what must it have been like to look on this catastro-
phe, these extremes of hope and fear (joking Gonzalo, 
who is convinced that the destiny of the boatswain 
will save them; the mariners, who even before the 
“confused noise within” are wailing “All lost! to 
prayers, to prayers! All lost!”). 
It would have resonated with Cardano, who wrote 
one of the first books, if not the first book on proba-
bility—it would have resonated with Cardano had he 
been there. His autobiography records the following: 
In 1525, the year in which I became rector [of 
the University of Padua], I was almost drowned . 
. . Rather reluctantly I had boarded a craft which 
was transporting some horses for hiring. During 
the crossing, the main mast, the rudder, and one 
of the two oars with which the boat was manned, 
were broken by storm . . . and at length night 
overtook us. I reached Sirmione in safety after the 
other passengers had abandoned even their faint-
est hopes, and I was all but desperate. Had our 
embarkation been delayed but [a minute or so], we 
should have [all] perished. (Cardano 92)
Confessing his cowardice, the charming Cardano 
nevertheless sat down to eat a fish supper; his com-
panions, on the other hand, had no appetite except, 
as one biographer notes, the youth “whose rashness 
led the party into danger, and whose courage found a 
safe way out of it” (Morley 66).
Apparently in Cardano’s mind the episode was 
linked to gaming, for immediately, in the next sen-
tence, he launches into the following story: “Once 
when I was in Venice on the birthday of the Blessed 
Virgin, I lost some money while gambling; on the fol-
lowing day I lost the rest, for I was in the house of a 
professional cheat” (92). Cardano erupts in a rage and 
slashes the man’s face, though not deeply, he adds, 
but eventually he wins the money back, plus the rings 
and clothes he had lost previously, as well as most 
if not all of the “cheat’s” money. Cardano demands 
that the doors be unlocked, and “the master, see-
ing such a commotion and tumult in his household, 
and anxiously fearing every moment’s delay, I judge, 
because he had defrauded me in his own house with 
his marked cards, after making a rapid calculation of 
the slight difference between what he had to gain or 
what to lose, ordered the door to be opened” (93). The 
master, the house’s man, knows that ultimately he 
has the advantage.
The storm and the gaming table, the shipwreck 
and the speculator: this has been an introduction to 
an overarching project I’m calling “An Illegitimate 
Child: Epilepsy, Gambling, and the Birth of Proba-
bility,” and I want to wrap-up by saying a few words 
about that project, for with Cardano we have clearly 
entered the world of probability—Cardano, who 
some speculate was himself an childhood epileptic 
since he reported recurring “visions” of “a veritable 
chaos of innumerable objects rushing dizzily along 
[before his eyes] en masse, without confusion among 
themselves, yet with terrific speed” (131-132).
V. Probability, the Illegitimate Child 
My current research responds to philosopher Ian 
Hacking’s The Emergence of Probability, his touchstone 
on the subject. According to Hacking, no one could 
solve probability problems with any sort of consis-
tency before the mid-seventeenth century because, 
for all intents and purposes, there was no concept of 
probability until that time, at least as we understand 
it. And so the task of the historian of philosophy is 
not to explain how earlier thinkers got it wrong but 
rather how getting it right or wrong became possible 
in the first place.
Modern probability is an essentially dual concept: 
on the one hand, epistemological (“having to do with 
degrees of belief”) and on the other hand, aleatory 
(concerning “devices tending to produce stable long-
run frequencies”) (Hacking 12). As to the origins of 
such a concept, Hacking argues surprisingly (and in 
large part, in my opinion, convincingly) that proba-
bility is “a child of the low sciences, such as alchemy 
or medicine” (39) not the high theory of philosophy 
or mathematics. Probability’s emergence—variously 
spoken of as both a “birth” and a “mutation”—oc-
curred through a transformation of the concept of 
the sign, the “chief concept” of the low sciences, into 
a new kind of evidence, “inductive” evidence (Hacking 
38). Consequently, we must understand the role of 
the sign particularly in respect to early modern med-
ical theory, which was dominated at the time by the 
alchemical tradition of Paracelsus and his followers, 
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because this hermetic matrix accounts for the eventu-
al duality of probability even after its birth.
The concept of probability having emerged, the 
Port Royal Logicians were the first to measure it. To 
represent epistemic probability on a numerical scale, 
they used gaming as the model. “It may be tempting,” 
Hacking remarks, “to infer that probability could be 
measured only by using concepts devised for games of 
chance,” but “that would be a mistake” (85). The proof 
of this, in Hacking’s mind, is that Leibniz did so with-
out any knowledge of the “doctrine of chances” (85). 
Gaming, Hacking implies, played only an incidental 
role in this transformation, which in part dispels the 
mystery of why probability emerged only in Europe 
in the seventeenth century when gaming is global 
and most ancient (2). The barbaric gambling context 
is simply unnecessary, almost an embarrassment, it 
seems.
So if, in the main part, he’s right, then there are 
two questions: why does “our” specific conception of 
probability come about only in seventeenth-century 
Europe when, on the one hand, medicine is ancient 
and, on the other, gambling is equally ancient? An-
swer to the first question: Because a fundamentally 
different kind of medicine was being practiced that 
had not been practiced before, one not in the Ar-
istotelian or Galenic traditions. But even if that’s 
true—especially if that’s true—we need to look at the 
way the hermetic doctors were actually employing 
the concept of the “sign,” and this means their con-
ception of the diseases they were combating (in the 
preface to the second edition of his book, Hacking 
himself admitted, in general, that he needed to have 
been more historical than he was). The chief disease 
was epilepsy, which truly did for the first time come 
to the very forefront of Western medical debate. The 
cutting-edge doctors understood this disease as a 
“storm” (or sometimes a “quake” [Temkin 174], Pose-
idon the god of the sea classically being responsible 
for “quakes”—a storm which was also a “quake”).
If you think of it in this way—the body being 
wracked internally by a storm with its winds, a storm 
which is also a “quake,” then it’s very natural, it seems 
to me, to think of the epileptic fit as a kind of ship-
wreck. And so what we need to do, in my opinion, is 
at the very least think through the epileptic debates 
more thoroughly and historically, while at the same 
time, more speculatively, we might consider represen-
tations of shipwreck, for instance, that technically fall 
outside the medical debate proper, but which may be 
recalling it or in dialogue with it in another way, in a 
way that they haven’t before. It’s not that any artistic 
representation of a vessel wracked by storm somehow 
says something about epilepsy, but rather that now 
for the first time there’s probable reason to think so.
Hacking’s second question: why does “our” specific 
conception of probability come about only in seven-
teenth-century Europe when gambling is most an-
cient? Hacking’s answer is simply that gambling and 
probability aren’t as related as one might think. But 
here’s an alternative to Hacking’s reasoning. We can 
use what he did in the medical context as a model: 
we might look for developments within the history 
of gambling that occur only and significantly in early 
to mid-seventeenth century Europe. And we find 
one readily enough: the opening of the Ridotto, the 
state-sanctioned gambling house, and the invention 
of “legitimate,” mercantile gambling. As I’ve said, this 
was unprecedented, idiosyncratic, and inaugurated an 
explosion of gambling fever across the Continent and 
in England; I believe that we need to consider the new 
kind of gambling only now being practiced. Specifi-
cally, this means thinking through the—for lack of a 
better word—“de-personalization” of the gambling 
encounter and the ways in which the State was now 
profiting from it, the self-interest it now had in the 
miserable gamester. 
VI. Implied Odds and Ends 
Is the early modern rhetoric of mariner and game-
ster still alive? It is, at least, in contemporary talk 
about the emergence of probability (although one 
wonders about the degree of self-consciousness). 
Consider, in closing, another interesting, popular 
work on financial history, Niall Ferguson’s The Ascent 
of Money. “The history of risk management,” he says, 
“is one long struggle between our vain desire to be 
financially secure—as secure as, say, a Scottish wid-
ow—and the hard reality that there really is no such 
thing as ‘the future,’ singular” (Ferguson 178). The 
moral of the story is that “there are only multiple, 
unforeseeable futures, which will never lose their ca-
pacity to take us by surprise” (Ferguson 178). Imme-
diately following these remarks, Ferguson meditates 
on our own recent storm, Hurricane Katrina, before 
seguing into a discussion of insurance and its origin 
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in “Bottomry,” the insurance of merchant ships’ “bot-
toms” or hulls (186). This insurance was little more 
than a wager, he says with a bit of a snort: “In truth, 
all these forms of insurance—including even the 
most sophisticated shipping insurance, were a form 
of gambling” (Ferguson 188). The point here is to 
contrast these uninformed practices with the emerg-
ing understanding of probability, which supposedly 
would provide “an adequate theoretical basis for eval-
uating the risks that were being covered” (Ferguson 
188). But the truth, as Ferguson well knows, is that 
Sir Ernest Cassell, the gambler, was and is right: “Now 
I am called a banker,” Cassell said, “but I have been 
doing the same thing all along.” 
If Ferguson has referred to our modern world as 
“Planet Finance” (5), a world on the verge of wreck, 
we could just as easily call it the “gaming planet,”  a 
more bullish phrase. And so I’ll hazard a guess: we 
will understand the thing called modernity only by 
investing in its philosophy and history and by gam-
bling on its rhetoric, which is both less than philos-
ophy or history and perhaps more. It means taking 
“light” authors like Cotton, de la Vega, and Chancellor 
as seriously as “legitimate” authors like Spinoza, 
Shakespeare, and Hacking. It means getting serious 
about play at the Ridotto and disillusioned about early 
modern medicine. It means learning the lessons of 
the speculator and storm.
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